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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: FOR OR AGAINST? 
Jan Gorecki* 
THE DEATH PENALTY - A DEBATE. By Ernest van den Haag and 
John Conrad. New York: Plenum Press. 1983. Pp. xiv, 305. $16.95. 
Should capital punishment be abolished? The debate on this issue 
has been going on, in Europe and America, since the Enlightenment, 
and has produced a plethora of writings both for and against abolition. 
However, van den Haag and Conrad's book, The Death Penalty, is of 
an unusual kind: the exchange between the co-authors, one a reten-
tionist and the other an abolitionist, is reproduced "live" within a sin-
gle volume. This is a perceptive and entertaining exchange. Even 
though its participants do not alter their views in its course, they ap-
proach each other with open minds; they refine or even change at 
least some of their arguments under the impact of the discussion.1 
This format, however attractive, has its drawbacks. It makes it 
difficult to avoid repetitions. More importantly, it assumes that the 
adversaries will share a common, or at least corresponding, language. 
This correspondence is not always present in the discussions, however, 
because Conrad's and van den Haag's intellectual profiles differ. Con-
rad is a genuine empiricist who feels most comfortable when dealing 
with tangible data. He is open about his lack of axiological expertise,2 
and has no taste for speculation. "There is no room for the empiricist 
in such a discourse," he laments when debating the justification of 
criminal punishment (p. 20). Van den Haag, on the other hand, has 
little appetite for testing conjectures. He is a philosopher with an im-
pressive polemical flair. This basic difference between the two causes 
some of their arguments to bypass each other. 
This review analyzes van den Haag's and Conrad's most important 
arguments, and then turns to two fundamental problems with the 
book: its ahistbrical approach and its flawed view of human 
motivation. 
* Professor of Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Mgr. Jur. 1947; Dr. 
Jur. 1949; Dr. Sc. Jur. 1958, Jagiellonian University, Cracow. Formerly an Associate Professor 
of Law at Jagiellonian University, Professor Gorecki has written, among other titles, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1983) and A THEORY OP CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (1979). - Ed. 
1. See, e.g., van den Haag's rectification of his views on Thomas Jefferson's attitude toward 
mutilation (p. 52), and Conrad's more detailed elaboration of social and economic determinants 
of criminal behavior. Pp. 117-19, 123-26. 
2. He notes at one point: "It is . . • certainly beyond my philosophical capabilities, to re-
hearse all the retributivist justifications" of criminal punishment. P. 22. 
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I. VAN DEN HAAG: THE RETENTIONIST ARGUMENTS 
1. To support the retentionist stand, Professor van den Haag 
starts with a general question: what is the purpose - "[t]he intended 
effect" - of criminal punishment (p. 53)? The question is unclear: 
whose purpose does he have in mind? Does he mean, perhaps, the 
effects intended by lawmakers? In any assembly, the majority of legis-
lators are most often either absent, inattentive, confused or divided. 
The effects intended by the American public? As the opinion polls 
imply, the general population has no uniform view on the issue. By 
specialists? Their views conflict with one another, just like Conrad's 
and van den Haag's. Thus, the question seems not empirical, but nor-
mative: what should be, in van den Haag's view, the accepted purpose 
of criminal punishment? 
His answer is ambiguous as well. First, he claims that "the pri-
mary purpose of legal punishment is to deter from crime" (p. 53). By 
deterrence he means here "general deterrence"; norms of criminal law 
address potential wrongdoers, that is, all of us, to prevent us from 
criminal behavior. Thus, the two other widely claimed goals of crimi-
nal punishment, incapacitation and rehabilitation, become secondary. 
Deterrence thus understood denotes a number of psychological 
processes. As the first, van den Haag lists intimidation, which in-
cludes both the feeling of fear and a rational calculation of anticipated 
suffering. He stresses the calculation aspect most emphatically: "All 
the theory [of deterrence] says is that threats are likely to deter if the 
disadvantages threatened sufficiently outweigh the advantages per-
ceived in the threatened act" (p. 142). A serious threat deters from 
crime, just as a high price deters from purchasing (p. 142). Most peo-
ple "learn that crime does not pay and most of the time refrain from 
committing crimes" (p. 56). Those who do commit crimes "are quite 
rational" (p. 97); they make "[e]stimates of risk and estimates of at-
tractiveness" of various crimes before committing them (p. 56). 
Then, quite unexpectedly, van den Haag not only alters his stand, 
but contradicts himself: "Deterrence is not a calculation." People 
"just feel that stealing is wrong . . . . That feeling, not a calculation, 
deters them - so much so that most people do not seriously consider 
stealing nor calculate when presented with an opportunity for any 
crime .... [T]his attitude ... , internalized early on, [is] reinforced 
by the knowledge that stealing is punished" (p. 255). This theme of 
criminal punishment as moral reinforcement recurs several times. To 
punish means, for van den Haag, "to send a signal," and so to defend 
"the moral rules expressed by the law" (p. 275). He accepts J.F. Ste-
phen's view that "a crime also tends to be regarded as wicked" be-
cause it is punished, and he goes so far as to claim that "conscience is 
not likely to be very effective . . . unless there is the accepted custom 
of legal punishment" (pp. 30-31). 
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Thus, it is difficult to know how van den Haag understands deter-
rence. Whatever his understanding, he treats criminal punishment as 
an implement of legal policy; it should be used to deter potential 
wrongdoing and thus to control crime. But, as we will soon see, he is 
not a teleologist pure and simple. 
2. Whatever his precise conception of it, deterrence constitutes 
van den Haag's main argument in favor of the death penalty for the 
most abominable crimes, especially murder. He asks whether capital 
punishment deters murder more effectively than does life imprison-
ment, and he admits that we can hardly be sure. To answer the ques-
tion in a publicly convincing way, experiments would have to be 
conducted, but "they face formidable obstacles" (p. 65). Past compar-
isons of abolitionist and retentionist states were usually based "on the 
legal availability or unavailability of the death penalty rather than on 
the presence or absence of executions and on their frequency" (p. 64). 
Of the more recent studies based on past statistics, such as those con-
ducted by Isaac Ehrlich, his followers, and his adversaries, "none . . . 
seems conclusive," despite their sophistication (p. 65). It is "difficult, 
perhaps impossible to prove statistically - and just as hard to dis-
prove - that the death penalty deters more . . . [than] alternative 
punishments do" (p. 67). 
Having expressed this healthy skepticism, van den Haag suddenly 
discovers that we know the answer anyway: capital punishment deters 
better than life imprisonment. How do we know? From the common-
sense perception of deterrence. By common sense, van den Haag 
seems to mean inferences drawn from ordinary experience; "our expe-
rience shows that the greater the threatened penalty, the more it de-
ters,'' since "[o]ne is most deterred by what one fears most" (pp. 68-
69). One fears capital punishment most: "99% of all prisoners under 
sentence of death prefer life in prison." From this "a reasonable con-
clusion can be drawn in favor of the superior deterrent effect of the 
death penalty" (p. 68).3 (Somewhat surprisingly, this conclusion now 
finds definitive support in a study held inconclusive a few chapters 
earlier; van den Haag now considers the conclusion "well proven" by 
Isaac Ehrlich (p. 128)). By this reasoning, crucial for van den Haag's 
argument, deterrence means intimidation. Deterrence as moral rein-
forcement, claimed with respect to the death penalty in an earlier 
chapter (pp. 30-31), has suddenly been forgotten. 
3. Interestingly, in his rejoinder, Conrad makes a similar reversal. He admits, however reluc-
tantly, that we do not know whether capital punishment deters better than life imprisonment. 
"Speculations on the proper amount of punishment" needed for optimal deterrence "are not 
open to conclusive scientific investigation." P. 87. That is why "the evidence will never be cer-
tain," p. 83, and why "it is unlikely" that the question of the superior deterrent force of capital 
punishment "will be successfully answered." P. 66. Then, apparently stimulated by the excite-
ment of the debate, Conrad concludes: "Why should we retain capital punishment when a life 
sentence in prison will serve the deterrent purpose at least as well?" P. 293 (emphasis in original). 
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For those unconvinced about the superior deterrent power of capi-
tal punishment, van den Haag has yet another argument. He devel-
oped it earlier in a brilliant article4 - possibly the most ingenious 
retentionist statement ever made - and it proceeds roughly as fol-
lows. Granted, we do not know whether capital punishment deters 
murder better than any alternative penalty. If, in fact, it does not, and 
we nonetheless execute a murderer for the purpose of deterring others, 
the murderer unnecessarily loses his life due to our lack of knowledge. 
If, on the other hand, capital punishment does deter better, and we 
forego the execution, the innocent victims of those who might have 
been deterred will lose their lives. "I'd rather execute a man convicted 
of having murdered others," concludes van den Haag, "than ... put 
the lives of innocents at risk" (p. 69). 
3. In justifying the death penalty, van den Haag does not limit 
himself to teleological reasoning; he uses moral arguments as well. 
The difference between the two approaches is simple, although they 
are confused by many writers. Moral norms impose obligations, e.g., 
"one should not kill." Teleological statements (also called "instru-
mental," "consequentialist," or, ambiguously, "utilitarian") tell us 
what to do to achieve a purpose, e.g., "if one does not want to get 
punished, one should not kill." 
Various legislative proposals, among them the suggestion to retain 
or to abolish the death penalty, can be made as teleological or moral 
recommendations, or both. Van den Haag combines both to justify his 
retentionist plea. I have described his teleology: to deter best, we 
should keep capital punishment. His moral justification is independent 
of his teleology: as sanction for the most abominable crimes, capital 
punishment is morally right, that is, just. Therefore we ought to keep 
it (pp. 297-98). 
What does ''just" punishment mean in this context? Van den 
Haag stipulates that it means "to punish the guilty according to what 
is deserved by the seriousness of the crime and the culpability of the 
person guilty of it" (p. 55). Thus, the just character of a given punish-
ment depends upon an evaluation of the degree of guilt (and the seri-
ousness of the crime) and an evaluation of what sanction is the right 
response to that degree. Van den Haag is not always clear about whose 
evaluation he has in mind. His own? The American people's? Or is 
he referring to some absolute standard? He eventually admits that, at 
least with respect to capital punishment, the evaluation is his own: 
"My evaluation leads me to believe that, e.g., premeditated murder or 
treason . . . is so grave and horrible a crime . . . as to deserve nothing 
less than the death penalty" (p. 297). 5 By his unqualified wording, van 
4. Van den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 78 ETHICS 280 (1968). 
5. Van den Haag uses a similar kind of evaluative judgment to justify rejecting torture as a 
form of punishment. Disclaimers notwithstanding, see, e.g., pp. 76, 215, his stand on deterrence 
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den Haag seems to indicate that the death penalty should be 
mandatory. 
But how can the death penalty be perceived as just?, ask the aboli-
tionists. They use a long list of arguments, some of which refer to 
shocking facts. In particular, the abolitionists stress the enormous suf-
fering and horror and humiliation of those executed; one need only 
visit death row or witness an execution to become aware of this and to 
admit the wrongfulness of the death penalty. 
In rejoinder, van den Haag challenges the abolitionists' factual as-
sertions. To be sure, execution does make "an important psychologi-
cal difference" (p. 16): it increases the usual fear of death "because 
death becomes clearly foreseen and sudden," and, moreover, because 
the convict has been told by his fellow humans "that he is too de-
praved" to stay alive (p. 258). Nonetheless, the death penalty is, in van 
den Haag's view, not as big a deal as the abolitionists maintain. 
First of all, "the death sentence does not deprive one of a life one 
would otherwise keep. We all die" (p. 15). Second, "[t]he dead 
neither wish nor fear; nor do they suffer . . . . Hence, it is hard to see 
how one can rationally fear being dead. One is afraid not of death but 
of dying . . . . But execution is probably less physically painful than 
most natural ways of dying. Dying by disease is usually more painful 
and often more humiliating ... ," especially when one dies in a hospi-
tal (p. 16). 
How can one react to these words? To avoid personal evaluative 
judgments, perhaps I should limit my reaction to a single issue: these 
arguments are hardly consistent with van den Haag's hatred of and 
contempt for murderers. There are common murderers around, as 
well as mass murderers - from Kolyma to Auschwitz to Kampala. 
But, following van den Haag's view, do they really deserve our hatred 
and contempt? After all, the deaths they inflict would have come to 
their victims anyway. And do they not spare the victims the pain and 
humiliation of prolonged disease in hospital beds? 
II. CONRAD: THE ABOLITIONIST ARGUMENTS 
I. Professor Conrad is at his strongest when employing his im-
pressive experience and his humane concern to rebut retentionist 
claims. He is on weaker ground when speculating about the "philoso-
phy" of punishment. 
Why the speculation? Some liberals oppose not only capital pun-
ishment, but any criminal punishment; they would remove criminal 
law altogether. Conrad is a moderate liberal, and supports punishing 
implies that the death penalty would be more effective if accompanied by torture. Nonetheless, 
van den Haag rejects tortures; they are unacceptable "because they are revolting." P. 181 n.t, 
Thus, torture arouses in him moral (and probably also aesthetic) repulsion. 
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wrongdoers, however reluctantly. 6 But, because punishment brings 
about "infliction of pain or humiliation or deprivation on a fellow 
human being" (p. 19), he feels he must justify his stand. He provides 
"retributivism" as the main justification (p. 19). 
Retributivists usually justify criminal sanctions by an ultimate 
moral norm they axiomatically accept: wrongdoing should be pun-
ished. 7 This is not how Conrad argues. In his view, a modem society 
in order to function must provide for "external controls sustained by 
rewards and punishments," especially to create "the expectation that 
those who violate ... laws will be punished according to their desert" 
(p. 18). Retribution brings about "atonement for a wrong done" and a 
subsequent "reconciliation of the criminal with the community," to 
the benefit of "order and solidarity" (pp. 26-28). If, on the other hand, 
crimes go unpunished, "[t]he moral order is eroded; the social bonds 
that make community life possible are loosened" (p. 22). 8 Regardless 
of their validity, these propositions are purely teleological; we need 
criminal laws to preserve a well-working social order. 9 
From this teleological position, Conrad launches an attack on a 
purely moral justification of criminal punishment. He perceives Kant 
as the main proponent of this justification, and Kant's views become 
his target. For Kant, in Conrad's words, the question of justification 
"lay in an uncharacteristically superficial discussion of the problem. 
He flatly held that . . . the guilty criminal must be punished, and the 
moral order demands that the punishment be proportionate to the 
gravity of the offense. That kind of argument is nothing more than the 
insistence that punishment is right and requires no [further] justifica-
tion" (pp. 20-21). This superficiality, as well as the impact of the Ro-
man law (especially the Law of Twelve Tables), is said to have led 
Kant into acceptance of the jus talionis - the law of retaliation in 
kind (pp. 23-24). "As the Roman criminal law was the basis for the 
Prussian criminal law that governed the society in which Kant lived, it 
was natural that he should use it as his point of reference in developing 
his principles of justice" (p. 23). 
There seem to be some misunderstandings here. There is no super-
ficiality in the claim that moral axioms require no justification; no axi-
oms do, because ex definitione, axioms end the chain of logical 
6. "Aie criminals to blame?," he asks, having commented about economic and social deter-
minants of crime. His answer is: "We have no choice but to act as though they were." P. 125. 
7. Thus, they claim, like van den Haag, that it is right to punish wrongdoers and wrong not 
to do so. 
8. See also pp. 294-95. On Durkheim as the author of this argument, see p. 36. 
9. In the same chapter Conrad speaks about retributivism in still another sense: retributiv-
ism as it appears within the criminal process. Once the wrongdoer has been found guilty, "[t]he 
crime itself justifies the punishment, and the punishment has no other purpose than to be im-
posed as the legal consequence of guilt" (p. 19). In other words, guilt justifies criminal convic-
tion. This is obviously correct in any criminal court, but has little to do with Conrad's search for 
an external justification of criminal laws and the punishments they impose. 
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reduction. If Kant can be claimed to be an advocate of jus talionis, it 
is the jus talionis in some secondary sense only - he did not demand 
that punishment be truly in kind. 1° Conrad treats the harshness of the 
Twelve Tables as characteristic of Roman criminal law (pp. 23, 267), 
but the Twelve Tables were the law of tribal Rome, at the outset of its 
history; in the late Republic and under the Principate, the criminal 
law became milder than that of various liberal democracies of today. 11 
All of this is immaterial for Kant's Prussia anyway. In building their 
modem legal systems, Europeans borrowed the system of the Roman 
private law; they neither followed nor even knew the criminal law of 
Rome. 
2. Having acknowledged the need for criminal sanctions, Conrad 
develops a long list of arguments against capital punishment. Many of 
them represent the abolitionist stock in trade since Bentham and Bec-
caria or at least since Rush and Rantoul. However - and this is a 
genuine accomplishment after two centuries of debate - some of Con-
rad's arguments, even though not entirely new, have been conceived 
from a fresh perspective or rearticulated and sharpened, and thus have 
gained a new importance. 
His basic argument sounds simple: "My opposition to capital pun-
ishment begins with moral revulsion" (p. 11).12 But his is not an au-
tonomous morality. Conrad believes that the wrongfulness of the 
state's killing anyone, as well as any citizen's right to life, come from 
natural law (pp. 265-66, 268). To support his naturalist stand, he at-
tacks legal positivists, among them van den Haag, for their claim that 
"rights have to be legislated" (p. 266). He blames legal positivism for 
helplessness in the face of governmental oppression; if we have only 
the rights granted by positive law, how can we challenge Nazi geno-
cide? This pragmatic argument, even though instrumental at the 
Niirnberg trial, confuses law with ethics; after all, one can be a legal 
positivist and forcefully challenge totalitarian laws and cruelties on 
moral grounds. To be sure, following World War II, Gustav Rad-
bruch, one of the greatest legal minds ever, concluded that legal posi-
tivists are more prone to succumb to totalitarian pressures than are 
natural law believers. This may be the case; however, this is an empir-
ical claim which has never been tested. 
The idea of the wrongfulness of executions finds support in Con-
10. Kant uses the expression to denote only "the Law of retribution." See I. KANT, THI! 
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101 (1965). 
11. Van den Haag also disregards this evolution. In his view, "The Romans thought thnt 
'homo homini res sacra' - every human being should be sacred to every other human being. To 
enforce the sacredness of human life, the Romans unflinchingly executed murderers." P. 262. 
Which Romans does he have in mind? The inhabitants of the tribal city-state or of the Rome tlf 
Augustus? The former did not believe that homo homini res sacra. The latter did not execute 
murderers. 
12. See also pp. 187, 192, 196. 
February 1985] Capital Punishment 1187 
rad's belief in the intrinsically "human" nature of criminals. Most of 
those who have committed crimes display, through major parts of 
their lives, as much decency as anyone: "no man is always and only a 
murderer" (p. 10). Thus, by executing them, we destroy humans who 
largely are like and feel like ourselves. 
This view comes from Conrad's intimate experience with 
criminals, acquired through many years of work in prison. That 
experience included interviewing prisoners on death row, giving psy-
chological counseling, and witnessing an execution. As mentioned 
earlier, abolitionists consider this kind of experience crucial; the expe-
rience has been claimed to be so "brutally degrading" that if "those 
alone who have participated in an execution could vote on the death 
penalty, it would be abolished tomorrow."13 In the chapter opening 
the book Conrad briefly describes, with objectivity and poise, his ex-
periences and those of others. For anyone unacquainted, the descrip-
tion provides important insight. 
Ill. HISTORY AND MOTIVATION 
1. History, especially the history of changing human motivation, 
constitutes the key to the problem of capital punishment in the United 
States and elsewhere. Unfortunately, historical analysis is rarely ap-
plied to criminal justice; it is also absent from the majority of writings 
on capital punishment. While there are various historical comments 
scattered throughout the book under discussion, it is essentially 
ahistorical.14 
Capital punishment is a historical phenomenon. Accompanied by 
torture, it has been applied profusely and taken for granted in primi-
tive societies, past and present.15 The development of culture brings a 
tendency toward decreasing the severity of criminal sanctions. This 
tendency has been most clearly displayed in the history of societies 
that have gone through long periods of cultural progress, especially 
Athens, Rome, and various countries of modern Europe.16 . 
There is nothing mysterious about this tendency. At a low level of 
cultural development, the feeling of fear constitutes the main motiva-
13. UNITED STATES SENATE, To ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY (Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Criminal Laws and Procedures) 125 (1970) (statement of Louis J. West). 
14. Only one chapter; "The Constitutional Question," pp. 157-200, has precise historical lim-
itations - it clearly refers only to the United States. Nonetheless, the chapter does not fit the 
rest of the book well. Whereas the book asks the basic question whether capital punishment 
should be retained or abolished, this chapter deals largely with a different issue: who, under our 
constitutional system, has the authority to implement abolition, state (and federal) lawmakers or 
the Supreme Court? 
15. See generally A. DIAMOND, PRIMmVE LAW PAST AND PRESENT (1971). 
16. For a more detailed account ·or this tendency, see J. GORECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
31-79 (1983). This idea of the declining harshness of criminal sanctions was first elaborated by 
Petrazycki and then, in a different manner, by Durkheim. See id. at 130-31 n.5. 
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tion against socially harmful behavior. That is why barbarians needed 
severe aversive learning and were provided with it, in a genuinely 
functional way, by the early criminal laws. On the other hand, the 
motivation of the civilized man differs from that of barbarians; gradu-
ally, under the impact of long-lasting social training, the fear of sanc-
tion is replaced by other stimuli which prevent harm to others. This 
does not mean that fear stops playing a role, but that the role becomes 
only auxiliary. Instead, moral experience, the experience of duty to do 
what is right and to avoid wrongdoing, becomes the new stimulus of 
dominant importance. 
The growth and spread of moral aversion as the main motive 
against wrongdoing make the inherited severity of criminal penalties 
unnecessary; there is no need to employ the harshness of a prior era 
while, in the words of Chief Justice Warren, "the evolving standards 
of decency ... mark the progress of a maturing society."17 The use-
lessness of severity is readily perceived by the society. The severity is 
thus experienced, by the people who largely have learned not to harm 
others, as the infliction of unnecessary suffering. That experience can-
not but arouse the feeling that the inherited severity is unjust, and that 
sense of injustice generates, in tum, a spreading demand to make pen-
alties more lenient. This demand accounts for the general tendency 
toward the declining severity of criminal law. 
2. The tendency toward decreasing the severity of penalties has 
operated forcefully in the United States, and the abolitionist trend has 
been its major component. The struggle for abolition had various suc-
cesses in the nineteenth and in the first half of the twentieth century, 18 
but it stopped short of total success. Only in the mid-1960's did com-
plete abolition seem to be impending. The public mood was shifting in 
that direction, executions came to a standstill in 1967, and the aboli-
tionists felt that their day was coming; they hoped, in particular, that 
the then activist Supreme Court would strike down the penalty. Dur-
ing the following decade, however, there came a major reversal (only 
tangentially observed by Conrad and van den Haag). In the wake of 
Furman v. Georgia, 19 lawmakers in thirty-four states rushed to pass 
new statutes to protect their capital punishment statutes from consti-
tutional challenge. And in the wake of Gregg v. Georgia, 20 not only 
has the death penalty been reaffirmed in the law books, but also, since 
1977, executions have begun again. 
This reversal can easily be explained. Abolitionist sentiment 
17. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
18. In particular, several states abolished capital punishment, and all others reduced the lists 
of capital crimes. Moreover, in the retentionist states there was a steady transition from the 
mandatory to the discretionary system of death sentencing. 
19. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
20. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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reached its peak in 1966, but it has undergone a steep decline since 
then. Among the general public, the proportion of advocates of puni-
tive harshness, particularly those advocating the death penalty, grew 
dramatically.21 This new punitive mood has been caused by spreading 
anger about crime and fear of crime, that anger and fear having been 
generated by an actual rise in crime rates. Thus, casting about for a 
remedy against pervasive wrongdoing, the American public turned to 
the criminal justice system with demands for harshness and execu-
tions, and the system has been responsive to the public mood. This is 
exactly where Conrad and van den Haag differ most; van den Haag 
not only follows, but helps articulate the new punitive mood, whereas 
Conrad forcefully objects. 
3. The current resort to harshness is a mistake. To be sure, look-
ing to the criminal law for remedies to the growth of crime is an obvi-
ous option. But the effective use of that option calls for an 
understanding of how criminal law operates. Among barbarians, the 
law operates mainly by arousing fear, and thus it must be harsh. In a 
society on America's level of development, where moral aversion con-
stitutes the main motive against wrongdoing, criminal punishment is 
most effective as moral reinforcement, that is, as an implement of 
moral learning. Interestingly, as indicated earlier, van den Haag ac-
cepts the notion of criminal punishment as moral reinforcement. 
However, he neither develops the notion nor brings it to its important 
conclusions. 
The idea of using criminal punishment as a tool of moral learning 
is not new. It was hinted at long ago by Bentham, elaborated by Pe-
trazycki, acknowledged by Justice Brandeis. How can the idea work? 
Modem psychology provides the answer. 
We acquire our moral experiences in the process of social learning. 
The process operates in two ways: first, through persuasive communi-
cations from the society we live in as to what is right and wrong and, 
second, through reinforcement - rewards and punishments following, 
respectively, our merits and our wrongdoing. Legal norms may be 
most helpful in promoting this process. In particular, legal punish-
ments, if perceived as just and certain, operate effectively in both ways. 
First, they work as persuasive communications; they tell us that pro-
hibited behavior is wrong and should be avoided. Second, they oper-
ate as implements of vicarious instrumental learning; we witness, 
indirectly for the most part, punishments for wrongdoing, and our 
aversion to wrongdoing is reinforced much as if we were punished our-
selves. These two processes - communication and reinforcement -
converge to produce aversions having a peculiar emotive tone, a feel-
ing of duty to avoid wrongdoing; this feeling standing alone consti-
21. See J. GORECKI, supra note 16, at 108-10. 
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tutes a powerful motivation. 22 
There are two prerequisites for the effectiveness of this process, 
both of which I hinted at earlier: the punishments must be certain (or 
at least perceived as certain), and perceived as just. The former pre-
requisite constitutes a condition for any aversive instrumental learn-
ing; it has been clearly demonstrated, on humans and animals alike, 
that only punishments that are certain result in aversion and avoid-
ance, whereas intermittent punishments reinforce the behavior sought 
to be punished.23 The latter prerequisite means that criminal punish-
ments must match the moral sentiment of the society, that is, they 
must be imposed for behavior widely perceived as wrong, they must be 
applied with the degree of severity widely considered as right, and they 
must be applied consistently, in accord with the principle of treating 
like cases alike. Only then can the society make clear to all its mem-
bers that the punishments are being imposed for wrongdoing, thereby 
rendering those punishments persuasive as moral communications.24 
The criminal justice system in this country does not meet these two 
prerequisites. To be sure, perfect certainty of punishment would be 
both a utopian and dangerous idea; only an approximation of certainty 
is feasible. However, nothing resembling such an approximation is be-
ing achieved in the United States. The almost unbridled discretion on 
the part of those who administer criminal justice, especially courts, 
prosecutors, and police, results in widespread nonenforcement of the 
criminal laws. Thus, criminal punishment is not only intermittent, but 
it constitutes a very rare response to crime. Both Conrad and van den 
Haag are aware of this condition, and Conrad deplores it: "The con-
templation of unpunished crimes is disturbing ... " (p. 22).25 
Justice is also largely absent from the system. Again, unrestrained 
discretion is the major culprit, for it renders punishment arbitrary. 
This arbitrariness occurs at all stages of the criminal process, but it is 
most conspicuous in the context of plea bargaining - a practice which 
accounts for about ninety percent of all criminal convictions. Under a 
system of plea bargaining, lightening the sentence within discretionary 
22. For a more detailed analysis of this psychological process see J. GORECKI, supra note 16, 
at 71-74, and J. GORECKI, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-27 (1979). 
23. This rather unexpected discovery has been explained by Abraham Amsel and others: the 
intermittently applied punishment becomes a classically conditioned cue for the impending, 
nonpunished instrumental acts. See Amsel, Partial Reinforcement Effects on Vigor and Persis-
tence, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND 
THEORY 1-65 (1967); Amsel, Frustrative Nonreward in Partial Reinforcement and Discrimination 
Leaming: Some Recent History and a Theoretical Extension, 69 PSYCH. REV. 306 (1962). 
24. It is clear that punishments that are perceived as unjust in this sense have no persuasive 
power. For instance, if a court punishes someone for paying debts, applies an extremely harsh 
measure for a petty encroachment, or selects for punishment only a member of an ethnic minor-
ity from among a large group of those proved to have committed an identical offense, no one will 
be persuaded that the behavior is being punished because it was wrong. 
25. See also pp. 103, 119, 145. 
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boundaries does not result necessarily from a lesser degree of culpabil-
ity or any other uniform principle, but depends largely on how all the 
participants have played the negotiating game. Dismissal of some of 
the multiple charges is often equally arbitrary. Reducing the charge 
results in applying an arbitrarily selected criminal norm that, on the 
facts of the particular case, may not have been violated at all. The sale 
of sentences for guilty pleas sounds like a cynical exchange deal rather 
than moral communication, and the resulting arbitrariness causes pen-
alties to differ in like cases from case to case, judge to judge, and court 
to court. The basic requirement of justice - that of treating like cases 
alike - is gone, and thus cast aside is the just character of criminal 
dispositions along with their power to persuade us of what we should 
feel is wrong. 
4. The practical implications of this analysis are clear: to make 
the system of criminal justice work, uncertainty and injustice in crimi-
nal punishments are to be elimin~ted. This means that those who run 
the system, in particular the judges, prosecutors, and police, must op-
erate under an enforceable obligation to comply with the law. Conse-
quently, the law itself, presently contorted by the overwhelming 
prevalence of arbitrary practices, must be readjusted to make the com-
pliance feasible. All of this requires a major reform; a detailed discus-
sion of the reform would, of course, exceed the limits of these 
comments. Implementing the reform would be complex and difficult, 
and would require a major political effort. There seems to be no other 
way, however, to deal effectively with the crime problem in America, 
and an effective policy is badly needed and increasingly demanded. 
Those demands, precipitated by the spreading fear and anger about 
crime, find expression in the changing public mood of the past fifteen 
years. 
Unfortunately, this mood has not changed in the direction sug-
gested by this essay. Anger, fear, and the resulting hatred of the 
wrongdoer do not necessarily stir one to undertake general moral edu-
cation; rather, these emotions arouse the wish to deter strongly or to 
take revenge. Consequently, they spur requests for severe, rather than 
merely certain and just, punishments and, especially, for capital pun-
ishment. In this manner the angry and fearful reaction against the 
pervasiveness of crime in America has addressed the irrelevant themes 
of punitive harshness and capital punishment rather than the impor-
tant issues of certainty and justice in all punishment. Conrad's words, 
spelled out in response to van den Haag's comments on deterrence, 
thus appear eminently wise: 
[T]he resumption of capital punishment is . . . a needless distraction 
from the program that must be adopted . . . . [What is needed is] the 
availability of fair and proportionate sanctions for all crimes. This . . . 
implies a commitment to a difficult and expensive program. Many politi-
cians who wish to be seen as champions of law and order - without 
1192 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1180 
going to the trouble and incurring the cost of a realistic program of legis-
lation - correctly suppose that a vigorous support of capital punish-
ment will convince the public that they are not "soft on crime." This 
kind of humbug is the deceptive leadership that makes the control of 
contemporary crime so difficult. [P. 122.] 
5. What is, from this historical perspective, the weight to be ac-
corded Conrad and van den Haag's debate? The answer depends on 
how one views the question. A debate can hardly be more important 
than the problem it deals with. From the viewpoint of the proper 
functioning of criminal justice in America, the problem of the death 
penalty is marginal; it is not the penalty's presence or absence, but 
other reforms that are essential for effective crime control. 
On the other hand, whether we send criminals to death or not 
presents a moral dilemma of the utmost importance, particularly in a 
society that has not yet opted finally for abolition. That is why, at 
least as long as the death penalty is not removed from our law books, 
the interest in the issue will be intense, and the debate between Conrad 
and van den Haag will remain a relevant and important contribution. 
